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A “THICKET OF PROCEDURAL BRAMBLES:”1
THE “ORDER OF BATTLE” IN QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND HABEAS
CORPUS†
LAURA S. ARONSSON*
ABSTRACT
This Note is confined to qualified immunity and habeas corpus sequencing
jurisprudence. Scholars have debated these “order of battle” issues, arguing for a
mandatory constitutional merits analysis in every qualified immunity or habeas
corpus claim, while others have written articles that support the current
approaches with certain carved-out exceptions. A few scholars have discussed
qualified immunity and habeas corpus together, along with other doctrines, to
demonstrate alleged recent judicial activist tendencies. Others have discussed the
doctrines together in the context of civil rights, arguing that the qualified immunity
expansion and the introduction of the AEDPA standard has led to legal stagnation,
and, as a result, diminished civil rights. This Note is the first to analyze the two
doctrines together in order to argue that the Supreme Court’s current approach, a
case-by-case analysis, responds to inherent tensions within our dual system of
government and provides the best compromise. In coming to this conclusion, this
Note discusses the evolution of the two doctrines, while considering problems of
federalism, separation of powers, dicta, judicial economy, and fairness. Finally, it
analyzes various scholars’ suggestions, reactions, and criticisms to alternative
approaches the Supreme Court could impose.
INTRODUCTION
Qualified immunity and habeas corpus play important roles in the American
system of government as they serve as gatekeepers for constitutional claims against
state and federal officials. Both doctrines stem from a tension within government.
In qualified immunity, the tension lies between the executive and the judicial
branch, and, in the context of habeas corpus, between state and federal sovereigns.
The doctrines require courts to compare the plaintiff’s or habeas petitioner’s
particular set of facts to precedent and to determine whether there exists a “clearly

1. In re Troy Anthony Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
† Winner of the first annual Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy’s writing
competition’s online prize.
* B.A., Yale University, 2008; J.D. Notre Dame Law School, 2014. Thank you to the editors of the
Notre Dame Journal of Law Ethics & Public Policy and the editors of Notre Dame Law Review for your
comments and editing. Additionally, a special thank you to AJB and to PWH for your guidance in this topic.
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established” law or constitutional right that has been violated. Scholars have delved
into each test individually, by analyzing the application of the tests,2 effects on
constitutional rights,3 efficiencies and inefficiencies,4 and workability.5 This Note
is confined to the parallels between the qualified immunity and habeas corpus
frameworks.
The qualified immunity doctrine serves as a defense to claims against state and
federal officials who are alleged to have violated constitutional rights. The doctrine
balances “the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power
irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”6 The doctrine aims not only to
protect constitutional rights, but also to provide fair notice to officials,7 to be cost
efficient,8 and to prevent overdeterrence.9 An adequate balance among these
competing concerns should “provide government officials with the ability
‘reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for
damages.’”10 The Supreme Court has altered this balance over time by articulating
2. See Daniel J. McGrady, Comment, Whose Line Is It Anyway?: A Retrospective Study of the Supreme
Court's Split Analysis of § 2254(d)(1) Since 2000, 41 SETON HALL L. REV 1599 (2011) (arguing that many of
the significant habeas decisions in the past decade have been “arbitrary” because the “conservative” and
“liberal” Justices have applied the habeas standard differently, resulting in many five to four decisions).
3. See Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the Law Is: How Certain Legal Doctrines Impede
the Development of Constitutional Law and What Courts Can Do About It, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 87, 93 (2007)
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s current doctrine that allows lower courts to avoid constitutional questions
when deciding qualified immunity issues reduces the “content of our constitutional rights . . . to the lowest
common denominator.”).
4. In the qualified immunity context, Professor Chen argues that the standard created a paradoxical
effect in that the qualified immunity standard was created to ease the costs of these types of litigation, but
instead the doctrine has created a messy and expensive system of resolving these cases. See Alan K. Chen,
The Burdens of Qualified Immunity: Summary Judgment and the Role of Facts in Constitutional Tort Law, 47
AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1997). In the habeas context, see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary
Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2005) (examining the Court’s broader embrace of unnecessary
constitutional rulings in the context of applying the qualified immunity test) and Melissa M. Berry, Seeking
Clarity in the Federal Habeas Fog: Defining What Constitutes “Clearly Established” Law Under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 747 (2005) (providing an overview of the
Court’s application of the AEDPA standard and what constitutes “clearly established”).
5. See Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on
Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 677, 680 (2003) (discussing the
development of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), finding that the cases have left us “with a mix of light and fog,” and
attempting to articulate a “workable way of applying [the statute] in a fashion that comports with text and
precedent”).
6. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
7. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (holding that officials “must be held to a standard of
conduct based . . . on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of his charges. Such a
standard imposes neither an unfair burden upon a person assuming a responsible public office requiring a high
degree of intelligence and judgment for the proper fulfillment of its duties, nor an unwarranted burden in light
of the value which civil rights have in our legal system. Any lesser standard would deny much of the promise
of § 1983.”).
8. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“[A] ruling on [the qualified immunity issue] should be
made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is
dispositive.”).
9. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (“[T]here is the danger that fear of being sued will
‘dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the unflinching
discharge of their duties.’”) (citing Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949)).
10. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 (1987) (quoting Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195
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and revising the standards for the defense, but the most recent standard focuses on
the clarity of the state of the relevant constitutional right at the time of the officer’s
actions. Pearson v. Callahan11 articulated a two-part test to determine whether
qualified immunity is appropriate. Lower courts must ask “whether the facts that a
plaintiff has alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right” and
“whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s
alleged misconduct.”12 If so, the official is not entitled to qualified immunity.13
The Court, however, provided lower courts with discretion in determining the order
of application of these two prongs.14
The habeas corpus doctrine has similarly developed from a tension between
competing interests. Whether a petitioner is entitled to habeas relief—federal court
review of a state court criminal conviction—is subject to the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act15 (“AEDPA”). AEDPA served “to reduce delays in
the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital
cases.”16 The statute does this by preventing “retrials” and “giv[ing] effect to state
convictions to the extent possible under law,” while advancing “the principles of
comity, finality, and federalism.”17 This habeas standard, rooted in Supreme Court
decisions, evolved from strict scrutiny18 to be more deferential to state courts, and,
finally to the current standard under AEDPA, which imposes a significant hurdle
for habeas petitioners to overcome. Federal courts are authorized to grant a writ of
habeas corpus only if the state court decision “involved an unreasonable
application[] of clearly established Federal law.”19 Under this standard, federal
courts are permitted—but are not required—to determine whether the state court
erred.
To balance effectively concerns that are fundamental to our judicial system,
like fairness on the one hand, and efficiency and deference on the other, the
qualified immunity and habeas standards must be sufficiently clear to lower courts
to maintain uniformity, but must also provide flexibility in novel situations. The
doctrines provide discretion to lower courts to determine their methodology: with
qualified immunity, courts can determine the constitutional issue on the merits,
despite the fact that immunity applies or courts can dismiss the case because the
right was not clearly established enough at the time.20 With habeas, courts can
decide whether the state court erred or courts can dismiss the case because the state
(1984)); see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 (“The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in
compensation of victims remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an
official’s acts.”).
11. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
12. Id. at 232.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012).
16. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003).
17. Id. For a background and overview of the history of the habeas doctrine, see 2 RANDY HERTZ &
JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 32.1 (5th ed. 2005).
18. Id.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012).
20. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
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court’s rationale did not constitute an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
law.21 This Note will consider this “order of battle” issue raised by each of the
frameworks and will justify the current Supreme Court’s case-by-case approaches
by arguing that, while the tests permit a broad discretion in determining the order of
application of the prongs, this discretionary approach is necessary within a
government of separate powers and dual sovereignty. A flexible approach to these
doctrines adheres to both doctrines’ purposes of avoiding litigation and promoting
finality, while permitting courts to rule on constitutional issues when appropriate.
I. RELEVANT STATUTORY LAW
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs can sue state officials in their private
capacity for monetary damages resulting from constitutional violations.22 To
prevail on a claim, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that [he or she had been] deprived of
a constitutional or federal statutory right and (2) that the person who deprived [him
or her] of that right was acting under the color of state law.”23 Under Bivens,24
plaintiffs can also bring these types of actions against federal officials.25 Claims
against state and federal officials, such as police officers, parole officers, social
workers, schoolteachers, and governors,26 can include “illegal searches and
seizures, retaliatory discharges, cruel and unusual treatment of prisoners, and
deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”27 Courts
navigate and define the scope of these substantive rights through balancing tests
rather than bright line rules.28 In deciding cases on the merits, courts weigh
individual rights against the corresponding governmental interest. The qualified
immunity standard comes into play at the summary judgment stage, before courts
decide the merits of the constitutional issue.
Under § 2254(d) of AEDPA, a federal court can grant the writ of habeas corpus
only under certain circumstances.29 The adjudication of the claim must have either:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in
a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
23. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 US 635, 640 (1980).
24. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971).
25. Id. (holding that a constitutional violation “by a federal agent acting under color of his authority
gives rise to a cause of action for damages consequent upon his [] conduct”).
26. Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 618 (1998).
27. Id. at 617–18.
28. For examples of constitutional balancing tests, see Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 619 (1989) (“Thus, the permissibility of a particular practice ‘is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.’”);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347 (1976) (applying the balancing test in the context of procedural due
process).
29. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012).
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in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.30
This Note is confined to the way in which courts have applied the clearly
established inquiry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Qualified Immunity
The Supreme Court established the qualified immunity doctrine when it
interpreted § 198331 to incorporate all common law immunities.32 The Court first
acknowledged the doctrine as a defense to constitutional violation damages claims
in Pierson v. Ray,33 when the Court recognized the common law defense of good
faith.34 Since Ray, the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity test has shifted from a
subjective inquiry to an objective inquiry, but it still relies on the same key
principles.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes,35 the Court determined what type of immunity state
officials enjoy.36 The Court held that, unlike judges and legislators, officers enjoy
immunity only when they are acting in good faith and informed by reasonable
belief.37 This good faith inquiry required a case-by-case analysis of the officer’s
actions and included both objective and subjective elements.38 Under this
precedent, if an official truly thought he was acting within the bounds of the law
and he had a reasonable belief, he would be immune from suit. Likewise, in Wood
v. Strickland,39 the Court held that if the official “knew or reasonably should have
known that the action [he] took . . . would violate [] constitutional rights . . . or if
[he] took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
[constitutional] rights or other injury,” that official could not rely on the doctrine.40
The Court declared that officials should know of “clearly established constitutional
rights.”41
Harlow v. Fitzgerald42 expanded the qualified immunity defense by eliminating
the “malicious intention” introduced in Scheuer and Wood.43 The Supreme Court
30. Ides, supra note 5, at 681 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254) (emphasis added).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). This provision was enacted as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act. Pub. L. No.
42–22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
32. Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of Qualified Immunity, 64 MO. L. REV. 123, 125–26 (1999).
33. 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (recognizing a Fourth Amendment claim brought by black ministers against
police officers who arrested them for using segregated facilities).
34. Id. at 557.
35. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
36. Id. at 240–42.
37. Id. at 247–48.
38. Id.
39. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
40. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
43. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815–17 (1982) (“The subjective element of the good-faith

ARONSSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

6

8/11/14 7:50 PM

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY ONLINE [Vol. 28

eliminated the subjective component of the test and outlined qualified immunity in
objective terms.44 The Court stated that immunity is not appropriate “if an official
knew or reasonably should have known” that his action “would violate the
constitutional rights of the [plaintiff].”45 This change characterized the qualified
immunity analysis as a question of law. The Court emphasized the social and
economic costs of the good faith prong of the defense46 and this change would
avoid raising jury questions that could often preclude summary judgment and
sidestep the doctrine’s primary goal of avoiding unnecessary litigation. In stark
contrast to earlier cases in which the Court had focused on fairness and
overdeterrence issues, the Harlow majority shifted to an efficiency-based approach.
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan added that immunity should not be “available
whenever the plaintiff cannot prove, as a threshold matter, that a violation of his
constitutional rights actually occurred.”47
In Siegert v. Gilley,48 the Court further clarified Harlow’s objective test by
holding that the defendant must have violated a constitutional right.49 In that case,
plaintiff sued his former employer alleging that his supervisor had defamed him
with the supervisor’s negative response to a reference request.50 In applying
Harlow, the Court found that even if the allegations were accepted as true, the
plaintiff did not state a claim for a violation of any constitutional right,51 therefore
the claim failed at an “analytically earlier stage of the inquiry.”52 Chief Justice
Rehnquist declared that whether a right was violated is often a “necessary
concomitant” to the “purely legal question” of whether the right is clearly
established.53 Seven years later, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,54 Justice Souter
wrote: “the better approach . . . is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged
a deprivation of a constitutional right at all. Normally it is only then that a court
would ask whether the right allegedly implicated was clearly established at the time
of the events in question.”55 This approach ensured that contours of official
conduct remained certain, benefitting both plaintiffs and defendants. Deciding the
constitutional issue “promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to
the benefit of both the officers and the general public.”56 In the wake of Lewis,
defense frequently has proved incompatible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should not
proceed to trial . . . . [B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to
the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.”).
44. Id. at 807 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507–08 (1978)). “In the context of Butz’
attempted balancing of competing values, it now is clear that substantial costs attend the litigation of the
subjective good faith of government officials.” Id. at 816. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
45. Id. at 814.
46. Id. at 807.
47. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
49. Id. at 228.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 227, 231.
52. Id. at 227.
53. Id. at 232.
54. 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
55. Id. at 841 n.5 (emphasis added).
56. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
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lower courts were unsure of how to interpret the Supreme Court’s seemingly
suggestive sequencing jurisprudence, resulting in different methodologies among
circuits.57
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed the sequencing of the qualified
immunity test by unanimously announcing a strict two-prong approach in Saucier v.
Katz.58 Under this precedent, the proper approach is first to ask whether, “[t]aken
in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury . . . the facts alleged
show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”59 If not, the inquiry
ends and the case should be dismissed.60 If the facts alleged do show a violation of
a constitutional right, however, the second step is to consider whether the right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.61 By mandating lower courts
to ask first whether the facts show that the officer’s conduct violated a
constitutional right, the test required lower courts to resolve difficult constitutional
issues before even addressing the immunity question.
In 2009, the Court reexamined Saucier’s two-step test in Pearson v.
Callahan.62 There, the Court “held that federal courts are no longer required to
decide the merits of constitutional claims before determining whether a defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity.”63 The case involved a § 1983 complaint against
police officers who were alleged to have executed a warrantless search on the
plaintiff’s home that led to a conviction for the sale of methamphetamine.64 The
district court found the search to be illegal, but granted summary judgment to the
officers on qualified immunity grounds because the officers could have reasonably
believed that the “consent-once-removed” doctrine validated the search.65 The
Court granted certiorari and, additionally, requested that the parties brief the
mandatory Saucier procedure.66 In articulating the test, the Court held that lower
courts must determine “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make
out a violation of a constitutional right” and “whether the right at issue was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.”67 The Court, however,
provided lower courts with discretion in determining the order of application of the
two prongs because lower courts “are in the best position to determine the order of
decisionmaking that will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each
57. See Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Whether [the sequencing approach] is
absolute may be doubted.”); Horne v. Coughlin, 191 F.3d 244, 245–56 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that “if courts
always avoided the constitutional issue by repeatedly dismissing suits on the basis of the defendants’
immunity, standards of official conduct would tend to remain uncertain, to the detriment both of officials and
individuals”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Country of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5
(1998).
58. 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
59. Id. (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).
60. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
61. Id.
62. 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
63. Jack M. Beermann, Qualified Immunity and Constitutional Avoidance, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 140
(2009).
64. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009).
65. Id. at 229.
66. Beermann, supra note 63, at 140.
67. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
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case.”68 Since Pearson, the Court has decided several qualified immunity cases
using both the Saucier approach and the discretion afforded to them in the Pearson
analysis without clarifying its selection of one approach over the other.69
The discretion the Supreme Court afforded lower courts in Pearson has led to
debates among scholars. Some scholars argue that the Supreme Court has not given
lower courts a sufficient framework for applying the test, nor sufficient guidance on
when to rule on the merits of a constitutional issue. For example, Professor
Beermann argues that Pearson’s new methodology is “deeply problematic” as a
standardless, unreviewable discretion70 and argues that guidelines should replace
the mandatory two-step approach. He also contends that there should be a
presumption in favor of deciding cases on the merits.71
Other scholars argue that any ruling on the constitutional merits in a case in
which qualified immunity is appropriate constitutes dicta, is not permitted by the
Constitution, and results in an unnecessary expenditure of judicial resources. This
dicta issue begs the question of whether prevailing officials are permitted to appeal
the district court’s ruling on the constitutional issue when they have been granted
qualified immunity. This scenario arose in Camreta v. Greene,72 when the winning
defendant petitioned for certiorari of the circuit court’s finding of a constitutional
violation, even though the officer had been granted qualified immunity. The
Supreme Court carved out an exception when it recognized an “exempt[ion for] one
special category of cases from our usual rule against considering prevailing parties’
petitions.”73 In regards to the case or controversy requirement, the Court
determined that the officials possessed a sufficient Article III interest in the
resolution of the issue because they encountered these types of Fourth Amendment
issues on a regular basis.74 In carving out an exception, the Court stated, “We think
just such a reason places qualified immunity cases in a special category when it
comes to this Court’s review of appeals brought by winners”75 because these types
of rulings would “have a significant future effect on the conduct of public officials
and the policies of the government units to which they belong.”76
Justice Kennedy’s dissent opposed this carved-out exception to the Article III
prohibition against petitions by prevailing parties and argued the plaintiff had had
no Article III interest in obtaining this declaratory judgment.77 He contended that
the majority “overr[ode] jurisdictional rules that are basic to the functioning of the

68. Id. at 241–42.
69. See Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377–78 (2009).
70. Beermann, supra note 63.
71. Beermann argues that “[a]t a minimum, courts should be required to give reasons for not doing so.”
Id. at 161.
72. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
73. Id. at 2033.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2030 (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 2031. Ultimately, however, the Court held that this particular case was moot because
respondent was almost eighteen years old and had moved away from the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, so the
exact situation could not technically arise again. Id. at 2033.
77. Id. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

ARONSSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

8/11/14 7:50 PM

A THICKET OF PROCEDURAL BRAMBLES

9

Court and to the necessity of avoiding advisory opinions.”78
The history of the qualified immunity test and the move from a subjective to an
objective approach, illustrates the careful balance the Supreme Court has struck
between judicial economy, fairness, and deterrence. The most recent standard,
outlined in Pearson, sets forth a two-part test in which lower courts must determine
whether the facts alleged show a constitutional violation and whether that right was
clearly established.79 The Court provided lower courts with discretion in
determining the order of application of these two prongs80 leading to scholarly
debates regarding uniformity, judicial overreaching, and stagnation.
B. Habeas Corpus
The habeas standard is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), but, like the qualified
immunity standard, it has roots in caselaw. In an early habeas case, Teague v.
Lane,81 the Court held that, with two exceptions, habeas is not available to a
petitioner who relied on a “new rule” of law.82 In that case, a black petitioner
appealed the judgment of a state court jury convicting him of attempted murder.83
The prosecutor had used all of his peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from
the jury and the petitioner argued that those challenges denied him a jury that was a
fair cross-section of the community.84 After considering the constitutional claim in
light of past precedent, the Court defined a “new rule” as one that “breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government” or
one that was “not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s
conviction became final.”85 Two exceptions to this general rule provide that
petitioner can rely on a new rule if that rule places the “proscription of certain kinds
of primary, private conduct beyond the power of the government” or if that new
rule is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”86 Six years after Teague,
Congress enacted AEDPA. Section 2254(d)(1) imposes a limitation on federal
court review of a state court decision, allowing review only if the adjudication of
the decision at the state level “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”87
The Court first interpreted AEDPA’s language in Williams v. Taylor.88 The
plurality opinion described the text of the Act as the “functional equivalent” of the

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 2037.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
Id.
489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Id. at 292–93.
Id.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 301.
Id. at 307 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
Ides, supra note 5, at 681 (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2001)).
529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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“new rule” principle adopted earlier in Teague.89 Under Williams, rules articulated
by lower courts are still considered “new” for habeas purposes,90 but a rule dictated
by the Supreme Court in its holdings, rather than in dicta,91 is an “old rule” that is
clearly established within the bounds of the Act. Relevant law “may be sufficiently
clear for habeas purposes even when [it is] expressed in terms of a generalized
standard rather than as a bright-line rule.”92 Unless the claim at issue “breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation,” it will be sufficiently clearly established.93
The Court also found “that an unreasonable application of federal law is different
from an incorrect application . . . .”94 The writ cannot be issued “simply” because
the federal court finds “the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established
federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be
unreasonable.”95
Lower courts interpreted Williams in different ways because the Court failed to
offer guidance on the sequence in which federal courts are supposed to decide
whether the state court erred in its application of federal law and whether the
decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of that law. In Lockyer v.
Andrade,96 the Court revisited the habeas standard when the petitioner claimed that
California’s three-strike law violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and
unusual punishment.97 The Ninth Circuit had required federal habeas courts to
review the state court decision de novo before applying the AEDPA standard of
review.98 The Supreme Court disagreed with this approach, stating that “AEDPA
does not require a federal habeas court to adopt any one methodology in deciding
the only question that matters under § 2254(d)(1)—whether a state court decision is
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal
law.”99 The Supreme Court confined its analysis to whether AEDPA foreclosed
habeas relief on petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim and did not reach the
question of whether the state court erred.
89. 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion). See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380 (2000) (“It
is perfectly clear that AEDPA codifies Teague to the extent that Teague requires federal habeas courts to deny
relief that is contingent upon a rule of law not clearly established at the time the state conviction became
final.”). This standard was affirmed in Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
90. Critics argue that because so few cases reach the Supreme Court, this will have a stagnating effect on
constitutional criminal procedure. See Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to Its Logical Extreme: A Comment on
Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453 (1993).
91. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. The holding is not constrained to bright-line rules and narrow statements,
but consists of “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state
court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003) (citations omitted).
92. Williams, 529 U.S. at 382.
93. Id. at 381 (citations omitted) (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).
94. Id. at 410 (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 411. Under AEDPA, federal courts are authorized to grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the
state court decision “involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1) (2012). Even if the federal court believes the state court applied the relevant federal law
incorrectly, the federal courts must deny the petition so long as the decision was objectively reasonable. See
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 68 (2003).
96. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
97. Id. at 68.
98. Id. at 71.
99. Id. (citing Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225 (2000)) (emphasis added).

ARONSSON FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

8/11/14 7:50 PM

A THICKET OF PROCEDURAL BRAMBLES

11

Lockyer makes clear that courts have discretion to decide whether the state
court erred, but must always decide whether the decision constituted an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. In Carey v. Musladin,100 the
circuit court had granted habeas relief because it found that the criminal defendant
had been denied a fair trial after the victim’s family arrived at court wearing buttons
with the victim’s picture.101 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that although the
Court had ruled on certain courtroom practices in the past pertaining to state actors,
it had not ruled on the conduct of private persons in the courtroom.102 Lower courts
had split on the constitutionality of this type of conduct,103 so the state court’s
determination could not constitute an unreasonable application of federal law.104
Notably, although the Court reversed, it did not rule on the merits of the
constitutional issue of private persons in the courtroom.105
As this sample of cases suggests, issues such as judicial economy, fairness
concerns, and the potential for advisory opinions arise when courts must decide the
order in which they will address the inquiries within the habeas corpus test. Judges
have disagreed not only on the application of the AEDPA standard and what
constitutes an unreasonable application of federal law, but also on the federal courts
role in habeas review.
III. “ORDER OF BATTLE”106
The sequencing issues that the habeas corpus and qualified immunity analyses
raise create an enormous tension within the structure of the government. The
“order of battle” has been extensively debated with respect to both doctrines, but
the structural principles that the two doctrines evoke have not yet been compared to
one another. As discussed in Part II.A, in the qualified immunity context, the
Supreme Court in Pearson gave lower courts discretion to determine whether it is
appropriate to analyze constitutional issues, rather than requiring the constitutional
inquiry as a first step as in Saucier.107 Likewise, in the habeas context, in Lockyer,
the Court recognized that lower courts are permitted to approach the analysis in the

100. 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
101. Id. at 72.
102. Id. at 70.
103. Id. at 71.
104. Id.
105. For another recent example in which a court declined to address whether the petitioner’s
constitutional rights were violated, see Jackson v. Litscher, 194 F. Supp. 2d 849, 865 (2002). In this case, the
Seventh Circuit declined to address whether an officer’s misleading statements in an attempt to induce a
Miranda waiver violated the Fifth Amendment, and considered only whether the state court decision was
“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Id. (citation
omitted).
106. In the qualified immunity context, scholars have termed this issue the “order of battle” dilemma. See
James E. Pfander, Essay, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for Nominal
Damages, 111 COLUM. L REV. 1602, 1607 (2011). See also Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity
Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 668 (2009) (“Pearson’s holding has, if anything,
intensified the debate over the proper procedural framework for addressing qualified immunity claims.”).
107. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 241–42 (2009).
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best way they see fit.108 In both Pearson and Lockyer, the Court discouraged lower
courts from unnecessarily exercising their power either to reanalyze the state court
issue in habeas or to rule on the constitutional issue in qualified immunity. In other
ways, however, the Court expanded lower courts’ discretionary power to dismiss
cases without having to address the constitutional issue. The application of the
tests, specifically the ordering, can change the outcome of not only the case at hand,
but can also have significant future implications on future cases and on the
development of constitutional law as a whole.
In the qualified immunity context, while there may be some overlap in deciding
whether a right exists and whether the right was clearly established at the time of
the action, the two issues are articulated as distinct questions. And their analyses
are different. In deciding whether the officer violated a plaintiff’s constitutional
right, courts must look to caselaw and to modes of constitutional interpretation,
whereas in analyzing the “clearly established” prong, a “purely legal analysis,”
courts are confined to caselaw.109 In the habeas analysis, federal courts consider
whether Supreme Court precedent has created clearly established law and whether
the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of that
precedent.
The sequencing decision in both cases is a judgment call, which allows courts
to tailor the approach to the case at hand. Like many other areas of constitutional
law, these decisions involve balancing one competing interest against the other.110
Relevant policy concerns include the need to develop constitutional law versus
efficiency and fairness issues. In deciding which approach to take in qualified
immunity, many factors come into play. Courts should be hesitant to dismiss an
issue on the clearly established prong without deciding the merits before
considering the potential impact on future plaintiffs of a ruling on the constitutional
issue, petitioners’ incentives to litigate the constitutional issue, and how the set of
facts fits on the spectrum of clearly established rights. With habeas, by contrast,
courts have in front of them a fully developed record, one that has been reviewed
several times, and should hesitate before deciding whether a lower court erred.
This Part considers scholarly and judge-made arguments against the current
approach and argues that the discretionary methodology in the qualified immunity
and habeas corpus doctrines is optimal. This case-by-case discretion is necessary to
a government of dual sovereignty and of separate powers because it provides
federal courts with the option to stay their hand and dismiss a case or petition or to
analyze the issue on the merits if the circumstances are appropriate.

108. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).
109. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
110. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011) (stating that it is “sometimes beneficial to
clarify the legal standards governing public officials”). The Court provided lower courts with discretion in
determining the order of application of the two prongs because lower courts “are in the best position to
determine the order of decisionmaking [that] will best facilitate the fair and efficient disposition of each case.”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241–42. Justice Kagan warned, however, that “[i]n general, courts should think hard,
and then think hard again, before turning small cases into large ones” by ruling on the merits when a case
could be quickly dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2032.
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A. Courts’ Role in Qualified Immunity
When deciding qualified immunity cases, courts play a particularly significant
role because the Supreme Court’s guidance provides some flexibility for courts to
decide constitutional issues when the facts allow or to decline to rule on the merits
when there is not enough information. Courts can take one of four approaches
when confronted with a qualified immunity issue. These four approaches include:
(1) cases where the courts find the violation of a clearly established right
and thus, deny qualified immunity, (2) cases where the courts find no
constitutional violation and grant qualified immunity, (3) cases where the
courts invoke their newly found discretion under Pearson to avoid
reaching the “merits” prong of qualified immunity and grant qualified
immunity based on the “clearly established law” prong, and (4) cases
where the courts find a constitutional violation but grant qualified
immunity because the law was not clearly established at the time.111
While Pearson alluded to a standard for choosing which approach to take,112
courts still have a great amount of freedom in this arena.113 While discretionary
balancing tests are common, this type of methodological discretion is not common,
especially in a system of government that is based on separation of powers.
The Pearson Court offered some guidance on the methodology in its
articulation of the test. The Court noted that the Saucier sequence—first
determining whether a constitutional right was violated and then asking whether
that right was clearly established at the time—would be valuable when ruling with
respect to “questions that do not frequently arise in cases in which a qualified
immunity defense is unavailable.”114 For example, in Pearson the Court declined
to decide the constitutional issue on the merits even though it appears that there
were good reasons to do so.115 A few months post-Pearson, in Safford Unified
School District No. 1 v. Redding,116 a plaintiff brought a Fourth Amendment claim
against school officials who searched her undergarments under the reasonable belief
that she had brought forbidden prescription drugs into school.117 The Court
followed the two-step Saucier procedure, articulating the boundaries of officials’

111. Karen M. Blum, Selected Excerpts: Practicing Law Institute’s Twenty-Seventh Annual Section 1983
Civil Rights Litigation Program: Qualified Immunity: Further Developments in the Post-Pearson Era, 27
TOURO L. REV 243, 244 (2011) (providing an overview of which approach circuits have taken since Pearson).
112. See supra note 68 and accompanying text; infra notes 114–24 and accompanying text.
113. Beermann argues against allowing “judges to have complete discretion over whether to decide
unsettled constitutional issues, with no standard governing when the judges should reach the issue, and in
circumstances in which the decision will not affect the outcome of the case before the court.” Beermann,
supra note 63, at 171.
114. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
115. The parties had briefed the constitutional issue, the consent-once removed doctrine did not have a
clear Supreme Court decision at that point, and the issue was relatively “uncomplicated.” See Beermann,
supra note 63, at 168.
116. 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
117. Id. at 368.
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duties in this context and finding a constitutional violation, and then determining
that the right was not clearly established at the time.118 The Court did not,
however, explain why it reached the constitutional merits rather than simply
deciding whether the right was clearly established.119 Camreta v. Greene120
provided some clarification, warning that “[i]n general, courts should think hard,
and then think hard again, before turning small cases into large ones” by ruling on
the merits when a case could be quickly dismissed on qualified immunity
grounds.121
B. Federal Courts’ Role in Habeas Petitions
The Supreme Court has interpreted AEDPA such that even if a state-court
decision is clearly erroneous, habeas relief may not be available because the
decision may still be not objectively unreasonable.122 This standard forces federal
courts to stay their hand when a state court incorrectly, but reasonably incorrectly,
applies Supreme Court precedent. Federal courts, however, have sharply split on
the fundamental application of the habeas test, creating uniformity issues and
raising separation of powers concerns.123
For example, in 2007, Judge Reinhardt, sitting on the Ninth Circuit, dissented
from a denial to rehear a habeas petition en banc.124 He argued that § 2254(d) was
unconstitutional on its face in that it violates the separation of powers doctrine.125
He stated:
AEDPA’s demand that federal courts disregard the full corpus of
constitutional jurisprudence—including both the precedents normally
binding on them through stare decisis and the Constitution itself when
the state courts got it wrong but their error was not unreasonable—and
give effect to state court adjudications that, in the federal court’s
independent determination, violate the Constitution, makes a mockery of

118. See id. at 377–78.
119. Most circuits have interpreted Pearson to be “neutral,” in that the caselaw suggests the constitutional
merits prong to be optional and discretionary, and imparting discretion on lower courts to determine the
correct methodology on a case-by-case basis. For an overview of the circuits’ recent jurisprudence in this
area, see Ted Sampsell-Jones & Jenna Yauch, Official and Municipal Liability for Constitutional and
International Torts Today: Does the Roberts Court Have an Agenda?: The Repudiation of Saucier v. Katz and
Its Consequences in the Courts: Measuring Pearson in the Circuits, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 625–27
(2011) (tracking which methodology courts have used) and Blum, supra note 111, at 243 (2011) (examining
the legal landscape post-Pearson).
120. 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).
121. Id. at 2032.
122. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 376 (2000).
123. For example, Daniel McGrady analyzed the Supreme Court’s decisions from 2000–2011 and found
that the Court has been divided on the correct standard to apply. McGrady, supra note 2, at 1602. He labels
the conservative Justices the “blind deference camp” and the more liberal Justices the “de novo camp” with
Justices Kennedy and O’Connor to be something in between. Id. at 1602, 1618 (“[T]he two groups are
blatantly using entirely different standards of review.”). Some judges find AEDPA to be unconstitutional on
its face. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
124. Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1262 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
125. Id.
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the careful boundaries between Congress and the courts that our
Constitution’s Framers believed so essential to the prevention of
tyranny.126
Judge Barkett, sitting on the Eleventh Circuit, argued in her dissent in In re
Troy Anthony Davis127 that AEDPA was unconstitutional as applied.128 In that
case, the death row petitioner had admitted to being present during a beating of a
homeless man, but insisted that one of his companions shot the man.129 Judge
Barkett argued, “AEDPA cannot possibly be applied when to do so would offend
the Constitution and the fundamental concept of justice that an innocent man should
not be executed.”130 In sum, her dissent argued that “[t]his case highlights the
difficulties in navigating AEDPA’s thicket of procedural brambles,”131 and that
because the Constitution prohibits executing individuals who are actually innocent,
habeas relief must be granted to those seeking that relief in this circumstance.132
She relied in part on Harris v. Nelson,133 a case that recognized that “[t]he very
nature of the [habeas] writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced
and corrected.”134
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the divided Court granted the writ
in seven lines, instructing readers to, “imagine a petitioner in [petitioner’s] situation
who possesses new evidence conclusively and definitively proving, beyond any
scintilla of doubt, that he is an innocent man. The dissent’s reasoning would allow
such a petitioner to be put to death nonetheless. The Court correctly refuses to
endorse such reasoning.”135 In his concurring opinion to that case, Justice Stevens
stated that “[e]ven if the court finds that § 2254(d) applies in full, it is arguably
unconstitutional to the extent it bars relief for a death row inmate who has
established his innocence.”136 In dissent, Justice Scalia adhered strictly to the
language of AEDPA when he stated that the majority was sending the Southern
District of Georgia on a “fool’s errand” after petitioner’s evidence has been
“reviewed and rejected at least three times.”137 He stated further that “[e]ven if the
District Court were to be persuaded by Davis’s affidavits, it would have no power
to grant relief. Federal courts may order the release of convicted state prisoners
only in accordance with the restrictions imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective

126. Id. at 1270.
127. 565 F.3d 810 (11th Cir. 2009).
128. In re Troy Anthony Davis, 565 F.3d 810, 827 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 824 (majority opinion).
130. Id. at 827 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
134. In re Troy Anthony Davis, 565 F.3d at 828 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Harris
v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 291 (1969)).
135. In re Troy Anthony Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 954 (2009).
136. Id. at 954 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 954, 957–58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Death Penalty Act of 1996.”138
The sharply divided court in In re Troy Anthony Davis illustrates a fundamental
disagreement about the application of the “reasonable application” prong. Justice
Scalia inquired into Supreme Court precedent, which has never provided relief to a
person who has had a full trial, but later persuades a habeas court that
circumstances had he is “‘actually’ innocent.”139 Because there was no precedent
on point, the state court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established
law.140 Justice Stevens responded to this dissent by lamenting that Justice Scalia
would treat convincing evidence of innocence the same as a “minor procedural
error.”141
Recently, in Lafler v. Cooper,142 the Court was faced with the issue of how to
apply Strickland’s prejudice test where ineffective assistance of counsel resulted in
a rejection of a plea offer and a conviction at a later trial.143 In this case, the
petitioner received a sentence three and one-half times more severe than he would
have received had he taken the plea.144 The Supreme Court granted the writ
rejecting the state’s argument that a fair trial should “wipe clean” a claim regarding
the plea bargain process.145 The Court took a functional approach in finding that
this argument “ignores the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a
system of pleas, not a system of trials.”146 Four Justices in dissent, led by Justice
Scalia, found that the Sixth Circuit violated AEDPA when it granted habeas relief
and the Supreme Court did the same when it recognized “a whole new field of
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.”147 Justice Scalia
mentioned the economic effects of the majority’s opinion, stating, “The ordinary
criminal process has become too long, too expensive, and unpredictable, in no small
part as a consequence of an intricate Federal Code of Criminal Procedure imposed
on the States by this Court in pursuit of perfect justice.”148
Justice Scalia’s approach in Lafler that emphasizes “federalism, finality, and
efficiency”149 stands in stark contrast to Judges Reinhardt and Barkett’s more
flexible and functional approach.150 Congress, with the aid of recent Supreme
Court jurisprudence, struck a careful balance between the federal courts’ duty to say
what the law is and the courts’ duty to refrain from interfering with a state court’s
138. Id. at 956.
139. Id. at 955.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 954 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
143. Id. at 1384.
144. Id. at 1386.
145. Id. at 1381.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1391 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 650–51 (1993) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Because
I am not convinced that the principles governing the exercise of our habeas powers—federalism, finality, and
fairness— counsel against applying Chapman’s harmless-error standard on collateral review, I would adhere
to our former practice of applying it to cases on habeas and direct review alike.”).
150. See supra notes 124–34 and accompanying text.
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final decision. Despite Congress’s strict articulation of this test, these cases
illustrate the disagreement that judges hold regarding the congressional purpose and
application of the AEDPA inquiry.151
C. Stagnation of the Law
With qualified immunity, the current standard provides federal courts with the
option to define constitutional rights by articulating the law.152 Many scholars have
argued for a return to the Saucier mandatory two-step approach that asks whether
the facts alleged show a constitutional violation and whether that constitutional
right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. By demanding a
decision on the merits, this two-step approach would facilitate the constant
development of constitutional law in light of changing circumstances and novel
factual situations.153 Through the statute’s requirement of a decision on the merits,
federal judges promulgate important constitutional standards that “will become the
basis for a holding that a right is clearly established”154 in later cases. Professor
Beermann argues, “[i]n some circumstances, repeated immunity findings can cause
the law to stagnate.”155 Without deciding the constitutional issue on the merits,
individual rights are sacrificed because “officials might repeatedly engage in the
same conduct and successfully defend damages suits with qualified immunity,
leaving the scope of constitutional rights undetermined.”156 When the scope is
unclear, a vicious cycle occurs—officials may continually violate individual rights
without repercussions. Despite these potential stagnation issues, the mandatory
Saucier two-step test creates problems of its own. This approach was met with
resistance by lower courts and was criticized by scholars as an unnecessary judicial

151. For a detailed history of congressional attempts pre-AEDPA, see Larry W. Yackle, Explaining
Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911 (1985). For an overview of the legislative history of the Act, see
McGrady, supra note 2, at 1605–09.
152. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
153. Pfander, supra note 106, at 1607; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (2009) (referring to the system the “degradation of
constitutional rights”); Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 3, at 87, 96 (discussing the Supreme Court’s duty to
say what the law is and how a number of doctrines make it more difficult for courts to develop constitutional
law). Professor Michael Wells asks “‘will it make it easier for court to decide that the law is unsettled, grant
qualified immunity and not get to the merits of important constitutional questions . . . . Now there is always
an argument against facing them.” David L. Hudson, Jr., Fourth Amendment Ruling Could Influence First
Amendment Law, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER ONLINE (Jan. 27, 2009), available at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/4th-amendment-ruling-could-influence-first-amendment-law. See also
Gary S. Gildin, Iqbal and Constitutional Torts: The Supreme Court’s Legislative Agenda to Free Government
from Accountability for Constitutional Deprivations, 114 PENN ST. L. REV 1333 (2010) (arguing that the
evolution of the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity test and the Twombly and Iqbal standard aligns with the
Court’s “legislative agenda” to expand the qualified immunity doctrine and discussing how this has negatively
affected civil rights).
154. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
155. Beermann, supra note 63, at 143.
156. See id. at 141. But see Leong, supra note 106, at 709 (arguing based on empirical studies that
mandatory sequencing of Saucier does not better serve civil rights plaintiff as a whole because “mandatory
sequencing does not correspond to any increase in the rate at which courts find for plaintiffs in the qualified
immunity context”).
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expenditure.157 In changing the required methodology, the Court afforded lower
courts much discretion in deciding the constitutional issue as well as the clearly
established issue. Discretion, however, may result in other issues, including,
potentially straining judicial resources, a result the doctrine is supposed to prevent.
Decisions on the merits may also be labeled “advisory opinions” if unnecessary to
decide the case at hand.158 Despite these potential issues with the afforded
discretion, the discretionary approach provides an optimal compromise between the
competing concerns.
Switching to the habeas context, federal courts are only required to analyze the
“clearly established” barrier imposed by § 2254(d)(1). This inquiry “does not
require federal courts to determine whether state court decisions are correct or
incorrect.”159 Some scholars argue that as a result, constitutional issues are not
addressed and the law stagnates. This issue is especially prevalent when there is a
constitutional or federal law issue that has been split amongst the states or circuits.
In novel circumstances, habeas petitioners may have no recourse to challenge unfair
jurisdictional procedures because the clearly established inquiry confines relevant
precedent to the Supreme Court. In addition, so few habeas petitions actually reach
the Supreme Court for decisions on the merits that the law is not given the chance
to develop.
These limitations have spurred arguments from scholars suggesting a
mandatory review of lower courts’ analyses. Taking this approach, courts would
first ask whether the state court erred in that the conviction involved a violation of
the petitioner’s constitutional rights, rather than immediately considering whether
the state court’s ruling was contrary to “clearly established” Supreme Court
precedent under § 2254(d)(1).160 For example, in Lockyer, the case in which
petitioner claimed that California’s three-strike law violated his Eighth Amendment
right, the Court, in its “clearly established” analysis, described the state of Supreme
Court law in an abstract, vague manner.161 The Court stated that only one relevant
clearly established law—the gross disproportionality principle—applied to the case
and the Court admitted that, despite being clearly established, it was “not a model
of clarity.”162 The gross disproportionality doctrine, a discretionary inquiry, only
allows reversal in “exceedingly rare” and “extreme case[s].”163 Because the test is
vague on its face, it serves as a particularly difficult constitutional issue to
overcome under § 2254(d)(1)’s unreasonable application of federal law inquiry.164
157. See Healy, supra note 4, at 902–03; Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of Merits-First
Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 16 GEO. MASON L.
REV 53, 59–68 (2008).
158. See infra Part III.D; see also Beermann, supra note 63, at 142.
159. Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 3.
160. Adelman & Deitrich, supra note 3.
161. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 68 (2003). See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text.
162. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 62, 73 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991)) (“Thus, in this
case, the only relevant clearly established law amenable to [the] framework is the gross disproportionality
principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’
case.”).
163. Id. at 70.
164. Professor Ides argues that, in this case, in defining the contours of this right, the court relied on dicta.
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Much like the cycle discussed with qualified immunity,165 when the Court describes
the law in broad terms, rather than clarifying the bounds of the law, the ambiguity is
intensified and it becomes increasingly difficult for later courts to grant habeas
relief in that area of the law. For example, Professor Ides argues that when the
Court defined the gross disproportionality principle in this manner, “the Court [may
have] eschew[ed] its duty to describe the clearly established principles that will
guide its application of the federal review standards,” resulting in an “abdication,”
rather than a mere respectful deference to the state court.166
Likewise, in Wright v. Van Patten,167 an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, the Supreme Court vaguely described the broad Sixth Amendment right and
determined that it was unclear what standard applied in the matter.168 In this case,
the petitioner produced evidence that his lawyer participated in his plea colloquy
over speaker-phone.169 The district court and the Seventh Circuit disagreed about
which constitutional test, Strickland v. Washington170 or United States v. Cronic,171
applied to the case.172 In its opinion, the Court took no position on which test was
appropriate.173 Because the area of law was ambiguous, the Court found that the
district court could not have unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.174
The district court’s decision, therefore, was upheld not because there was no
precedent, but because it was unclear which precedent applied. In scenarios like
these, when the Court does not rule on the merits, the Court, in its discretion,
determines that the particular case at hand did not afford an appropriate set of facts
on which to decide the constitutional question. Much like the qualified immunity
sequencing issue, this discretion has resulted in a dichotomy among judges. Some
judges favor promoting the development of constitutional law and some judges
follow the principles of constitutional avoidance.175
D. Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings
Since Marbury v. Madison,176 federal courts have understood that it is their
See Ides, supra note 5, at 734, 737 (“It will be rare indeed that a state-court decision will be either contrary to
or involve an unreasonable application of amorphously described federal law.”).
165. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
166. Ides, supra note 5, at 747.
167. 552 U.S. 120 (2008).
168. Id. at 121.
169. Id.
170. 466 U.S. 688 (1984).
171. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
172. Wright, 552 U.S. at 122.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. For some examples of this dichotomy, see Beermann, supra note 63, at 178–79. See also David L.
Hudson, Pearson v. Callahan and Qualified Immunity: Impact on First Amendment Law, 10 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 125, 129 (2011) (“Judges have seized upon enhanced flexibility to grant qualified immunity provided by
Pearson and impacted numerous areas [constitutional] law.”). But see Pierre N. Leval, Madison Lecture:
Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1249, 1253 n.17 (2006) (arguing that
judges should be hesitant to resolve complicated constitutional questions).
176. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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duty to resolve ambiguities that arise from cases.177 The Court has stated: “We
ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is
unavoidable.”178 In a law review article in 2006, Judge Leval of the Second Circuit
outlined the difference between dicta and holding. He wrote that in crafting a
holding, courts will state: “A plus B plus C make out a claim (the holding),”
however courts will often add that “if D were present . . . there would be no
claim.”179 This “dictum” can be viewed as “narrowing the holding.”180 When a
similar issue arises in a future case, and D is actually present in that case, the prior
holding directs one result, when in reality, D might have a more significant effect
on the case than what the prior court had even “envisioned at the time of the earlier
opinion.”181 Judge Leval argues that not only is this type of overreaching
prohibited by the Constitution’s cases and controversies requirement, but it also
likely produces bad law and increases the judicial branch’s workload.182 According
to Judge Leval, courts must rule on the merits only when the issue at hand has been
sufficiently argued on both sides and is ripe for review.
The adversarial process and incentives to litigate serve as policy justifications
for the usual practice of avoiding constitutional questions that are unnecessary to
the resolution of the particular case. Under the current framework, in qualified
immunity, a civil rights plaintiff must vigorously argue that the defendant violated
his or her constitutional rights and those rights were clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation. Habeas petitioners, likewise, must prove a constitutional
violation and show that that violation was clearly established by Supreme Court
precedent at the time. Defendants are not required to argue both because they can
prevail by arguing that the alleged right was not clearly established. In many cases,
therefore, only petitioners and plaintiffs have a strong incentive to argue vigorously
the constitutional issue.183 Even if defendants do argue both, courts still may not be
properly informed in making their decisions because of limited judicial resources
and because of a potential bias in knowing the outcome of the case without having
to resolve the constitutional issue.
In qualified immunity, the broad discretion afforded to district courts to define
constitutional rights has the potential to raise dicta issues, because constitutional
questions should only be decided if their resolution is necessary to resolving the
particular case before the court. Judge Leval addressed the Saucier holding directly
(pre-Pearson), criticizing Saucier as “mischievous,” because before dismissing a
177. Id. at 163.
178. Doc v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316, 343 (1999) (holding that courts must
construe statutes to avoid such constitutional questions that are difficult unless construction is plainly contrary
to the intention of congress); Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173
(2001). For an argument that the Court has more generally embraced unnecessary constitutional rulings, see
Healy, supra note 4, at 884 (arguing that because of docket discretion, the decline of the political question
doctrine, the weakening of the mootness doctrine, and an overall less deferential approach taken to
Congressional acts, that the Court has developed a different view of itself).
179. Leval, supra note 175, at 1253 n.17.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 1255.
183. See Healy, supra note 4, at 913.
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case on qualified immunity grounds, “the court must first either gratuitously declare
a new constitutional right in dictum or decide that the claimed right does not
exist.”184 Likewise, Justice Breyer referred to the period in which Saucier
controlled as the “failed Saucier experiment”185 and Justice Alito has called it a
“puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum.”186 Many scholars agreed.
Professor Beermann took issue with Saucier’s procedure as “fl[ying] in the face of
the general norm against dicta and the related, even stronger norm against the
unnecessary decision of constitutional issues.”187 While many of these concerns
have been alleviated by the Pearson standard which was articulated in 2009, the
standard still provides lower courts the discretion to exercise this controversial
power. Recently, the Supreme Court declined to address the constitutional question
in Reichle v. Howards,188 a qualified immunity case. In this case, the plaintiff
claimed he had been arrested because of his political speech when he made negative
remarks about then-Vice President Cheney.189 The Court held that the officials
were entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time, it was not clearly
established that a probable cause arrest could create a First Amendment
violation.190 Justice Thomas authored the opinion, rehashing Pearson’s discretional
standard and stating that ”[t]his approach comports with our usual reluctance to
decide constitutional questions unnecessarily.”191
The Pearson discretionary standard runs the risk of judicial activism, but there
are sufficient safeguards in place. In qualified immunity claims and with habeas
petitions, a court will always know in advance whether its decision on the
constitutional issue will or will not affect the outcome of that case, and thus, can
tailor the opinion accordingly. The court can proceed straight to the clearly
established analysis to fulfill its duty of resolving the case192 or the court can decide
that a constitutional ruling is appropriate as well. In the habeas context, a federal
court can find that the state court incorrectly interpreted the Constitution, but if the
decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established
184. Leval, supra note 175, at 1276 & n.82. Judge Leval comically discusses a hypothetical conversation
between a judge and a defendant-official’s attorney under Saucier’s mandatory two-step framework. Id. If
the court recognizes the right to be not sufficiently clearly established, the judge is still required to rule on the
constitutional issue and he or she must ask the attorneys to brief the issue. Id. Defendant-official’s attorney
might respond, “my client couldn’t care less what you decide on that point. He has no interest in it. I can’t
charge for writing a brief the client has no interest in. He is entitled to the dismissal no matter what you
conclude about the theoretical existence of the right.” Id. at 1278. Justice Scalia suggested curing this
potential problem by allowing defendant to petition to the Supreme Court for review of the declaration of a
right in dictum. See Bunting v. Mellon, 541 U.S. 1019, 1023, 1025 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Judge
Leval, however, found it hard to believe that a defendant would appeal after he or she has won. Leval, supra
note 175, at 1278. This precise situation occurred when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Camreta v.
Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011). See infra notes 194–208.
185. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 432 (2007) (Breyer, J. concurring in the judgment and dissenting
in part).
186. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234–35 (2009).
187. Beermann, supra note 63, at 151.
188. 132 S. Ct. 2088 (2012).
189. Id. at 2092.
190. Id. at 2097.
191. Id. at 2093.
192. Healy, supra note 4, at 903.
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federal law, a ruling that the decision was merely incorrect is immaterial. The
discretionary standards sufficiently account for the dicta issue so long as courts
takes into account a number of factors, such as how the set of facts conform to
precedent, how well the parties have briefed the issue, and whether the issue is
likely to arise again in the future. Courts are prone to be sensitive to the potential
for dicta not only because it is a central concept to the judiciary, but because of
limited judicial resources. For example, if a defendant has qualified immunity and
if the right is not clearly established, then deciding whether the right exists will add
to the court’s workload, especially if the circumstances of the case are not
appropriate to decide the issue on the merits. In the event a court incorrectly
decides an issue or proclaims an overly broad holding on the merits, future courts
may distinguish the case.193
E. Petitions by Prevailing Parties
Camreta v. Greene, briefly mentioned above, raises another advisory opinion
question in its consideration of whether a court of appeals is permitted to rule on an
official’s petition who has prevailed on qualified immunity grounds, but who
disagrees with the constitutional determination.194 In this case, a state child
protective service worker interviewed a nine year-old child about allegations that
her father sexually abused her.195 The mother sued under § 1983 alleging that the
interview constituted an unreasonable seizure.196 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the officials because the right to be free from an
unreasonable search and seizure in this type of circumstance was not clearly
established at the time.197 Although defendant social worker was granted summary
judgment, he petitioned for review on the ruling that this conduct violated the
Constitution. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s qualified immunity
ruling, but also ruled on the merits of the constitutional claim, finding a Fourth
Amendment violation.198 The court stated that its decision to rule on the merits
“provide[d] guidance to those charged with the difficult task of protecting child
welfare within the confines of the [Constitution].”199 On certiorari, the question for
the Supreme Court was whether his petition violated the rule against petitions by
prevailing parties.200
In its holding, the Supreme Court articulated an exception to the prevailing
party rule, in part, as an attempt to solve the stagnation issues created by the
discretionary qualified immunity standard.201 The Court declared that the critical
question under Article III in cases in which petitioner prevailed in the court below
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Courts can use their judgment under the “clearly established” prong to distinguish prior cases.
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2028 (2011).
Id. at 2026.
Id. at 2027.
Id.
Id. at 2031 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009)).
Id. at 2027.
Id.
Id. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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is “whether the litigant retains the necessary personal stake in the appeal.”202 The
Court noted that an interest in a ruling can constitute a sufficient personal stake if it
has a prospective effect on that party.203 In general, because of lacking judicial
resources, the Court has “declined to consider cases at the request of a prevailing
party, even when the Constitution allow[s],”204 but in qualified immunity cases, the
Court held that the nature of the doctrine “supports bending [the] usual rule to
permit consideration of immunized officials’ petitions.”205
Some Justices in Camreta, however, characterized the majority’s decision as an
unconstitutional extension of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.206 The dissent in
this case was unwilling to compromise jurisdictional requirements and conventional
dictum rules to further the development of constitutional law in qualified immunity
cases.207 Justice Scalia, although agreeing with the judgment of the majority, noted
in his concurrence that he might later consider “end[ing] the extraordinary practice
of ruling upon constitutional questions unnecessarily when the defendant possesses
qualified immunity.”208
Shifting to the habeas context, in a pre-AEDPA case, Teague v. Lane,209 Justice
O’Connor directly addressed the dictum issues the habeas doctrine raises. In her
plurality opinion, the threshold issue was whether the claim relied on a “new rule”
of criminal procedure.210 If so, the Court should dismiss without considering the
merits of the asserted rule “because a habeas petition may not be granted on the
basis of a new rule, any opinion expressed by the court on the merits of the rule
would be merely advisory.”211 According to Teague, therefore, when a petitioner
seeks habeas relief on a new principle of criminal law, lower courts are instructed to
dismiss that petition without hearing the claim on the merits.
F. Alternatives to the Current Approach
While this Note has argued thus far that the current frameworks for the
qualified immunity and habeas corpus doctrines serve to promote effectively
judicial economy, federalism, and separation of powers principles, others find the
scope of doctrines to be too narrow to protect constitutional rights.212 For habeas
petitioners and for civil rights plaintiffs, the qualified immunity and habeas
standards act as a barrier to relief, shielding government officials from the
202. Id. at 2028 (majority opinion) (citing Deposit Guaranty Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 332–336
(1980)).
203. Id. at 2029.
204. Id. at 2030 (citations omitted).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2042 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2036 (Scalia, J., concurring). See also Country of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859
(1998) (Stevens, J. concurring) (stating that when a “question is both difficult and unresolved, I believe it
wiser to adhere to the policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions”).
209. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).
210. Id. at 299–301.
211. Id.; Healy, supra note 4, at 884.
212. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite”, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 297 (2006).
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consequences of their unconstitutional acts or decisions. A recent New York Times
article notes that judges, “some of whom have ruled in favor of the death penalty
many times, have complained that Congress and the Supreme Court have raised
daunting barriers for petitioners to appeal their convictions.”213 Eric Freedman
notes that there is increasing frustration amongst judges and that they have become
less likely to adhere to “legalistic mumbo-jumbo . . . which prevents them from
reaching fair results.”214
Scholars have attempted to articulate reasonable alternative standards.215 For
death row inmates, Daniel McGrady argues for congressional revision of AEDPA
such that a different habeas standard applies.216 In capital cases, courts would
review federal law claims de novo.217 Professor Beermann argues that Pearson’s
new methodology is “deeply problematic” because it provides lower courts with an
unreviewable discretion.218 He proposes a set of guidelines to replace the two-step
approach.219 He also contends that there should be a presumption in favor of
deciding cases on the merits.220
Professor Pfander proposes a new doctrine, to be judicially-developed, that
would encourage civil rights plaintiffs who cannot satisfy the qualified immunity
standard to sue for nominal damages.221 In order to state a claim, plaintiffs would
need to disclose in the complaint the fact that he or she is only seeking nominal
damages, rather than compensatory and punitive damages and litigation costs and
attorney’s fees.222 Pfander compares this type of litigation to declaratory and
injunctive types of relief and argues that this doctrine would encourage the
initiation of more suits against low-level officials, but would not increase the level
of frivolous suits.223 He cites the Court’s recent decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal224
which requires a more developed factual record at the pleading stage, as a barrier
213. John Schwartz, Judges’ Dissents For Death Row Inmates Are Rising, N.Y. TIMES, (August 13,
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/14/us/14dissent. html?_r=2&; (citing Judge Reinhardt’s
dissent that found the act to have made “a mockery of the careful boundaries between Congress and the courts
that our Constitution’s framers believed so essential to the prevention of tyranny”).
214. Id.
215. See Ides, supra note 5, at 680 (discussing the development of § 2254(d)(1) that has left us “with a
mix of light and fog,” and attempting to find a “workable way of applying [the statute] in a fashion that
comports with text and precedent”); see also Leong, supra note 106, at 709 (“[T]he decision to decide the
constitutional question should result from the thoughtful assessment of two relevant factors: whether the
constitutional issue is likely to be repeated without ever becoming more susceptible to review and whether the
issue is adequately presented in the particular case, taking account of the procedural posture of the case, the
corresponding thoroughness of the parties’ briefing of the constitutional issue, and the level of factual
development.”).
216. See McGrady, supra note 2.
217. Id.
218. Beermann, supra note 63.
219. Id.
220. Beermann argues that “[a]t a minimum, courts should be required to give reasons for not [reaching
the merits of the constitutional issue].” Id. at 161.
221. Pfander, supra note 106, at 1607, 1639 (suggesting nominal damages suits as a way for plaintiffs “to
secure an adjudication of constitutional claims in a world of legal novelty or uncertainty”).
222. Id. at 1619.
223. Id. at 1636.
224. 556 U.S. 262 (2009).
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for those meritless claims.225 With this approach, the court could reach a decision
on the merits and giv[e] content to constitutional law”226 in murkier cases where the
law is not clearly established enough to satisfy the qualified immunity threshold.227
The difficulty with his proposal, however, is the judicial resources issue addressed
above.228 Courts may be unwilling to reach the merits on a complex issue when the
plaintiff is only requesting one dollar. In addition, seeking constitutional
“clarification” is not cheap, and there are not a lot of incentives to bring these
claims, especially for pro se plaintiffs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since Marbury v. Madison, the judiciary has been understood as the branch
responsible for interpreting the Constitution. Through their adjudication in the
qualified immunity and habeas corpus contexts, courts play a crucial role in the
development of constitutional rights. Both doctrines serve as barriers for plaintiffs
and state prisoners to vindicating their constitutional rights, as well as shields for
government officials who violate those constitutional rights. The Court’s decision
in Pearson provided courts with discretion to decide whether to define
constitutional rights, and likewise, AEDPA has limited federal courts’ review of
state court judgments to those that have violated clearly established Supreme Court
law. While these doctrines, in a sense, impede the development of constitutional
law, they serve judicial economy purposes and help to preserve federalism and
separation of powers principles. The discretion results in a necessary ongoing
tension between state and federal courts and between the executive branch and the
judicial branch. In some cases, deciding constitutional questions is necessary to
fulfilling the court’s duty to resolve cases presented to it, but, deciding
constitutional questions in dicta can result in serious consequences.
The discretion that both doctrines afford courts allows them to tailor their
methodology to the case at hand. While this approach runs the risk of judicial
activism and resulting dicta, there are sufficient safeguards in place. Courts are
unlikely to pronounce overly broad rulings because of the lack of judicial resources.
In addition, when courts choose to unnecessarily decide the issue on the merits, the
holding can usually be distinguished in later cases.229 If not, admittedly,
overreaching can result in severe side effects on future cases.230 These effects,
however, are inherent to the judicial system and are the unavoidable results of a
dual system of government.231
225. Id.
226. Pfander, supra note 106, at 1608.
227. Id. at 1607.
228. See supra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.
229. In qualified immunity, in later cases, courts can distinguish precedent using the clearly established
prong. In habeas, federal courts are confined to Supreme Court analysis, which serves as one uniform body of
law to consider.
230. See Healy, supra note 4, at 935.
231. Id. at 903, 917 (“[T]o a certain extent, the announcement of legal principles broader than necessary
to decide a case is an inherent aspect of our legal system.”). Usually courts do not merely repeat facts of the
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The current Supreme Court standards in the qualified immunity and habeas
corpus doctrines best resolve the aforementioned issues of dicta and stagnation by
maintaining an ongoing tension. When deciding which prong of either doctrine to
decide first, courts must consider on a case-by-case basis the particular facts of the
case at hand, potential stagnation and dicta issues, and judicial resources. The
qualified immunity and habeas frameworks respect courts’ duties to interpret the
law, while conforming to the doctrines’ goals of fairness, finality, federalism, and
the prevention of frivolous claims.

case and announce a simple, straightforward judgment; their decisions will almost always resolve another case
that is not before the court.

